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Disclaimer
First of all, this pure crypto research:
Spec of              Algebraic
the cipher  =>     Attack. 
Not all attacks work on actual industrial 
systems due to the protocol subtleties. 
Moreover: one should not expect that every information found on the Internet is 
correct. One can expect some small glitches…Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Outline
1. Hitag2 cipher and products.
2. Discussion: open source vs. closed source crypto.
3. Algebraic attacks with SAT solvers.
4. Our results. 
[Full paper published in ISC 2009, Pisa Italy, 7-9 September 2009, Springer LNCS]
5. Industry impact, discussion.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Hitag2
• A stream cipher used 
in car locks [e.g. BMW]: 
Philips Hitag2 family. 
• Also used in building access.
– According to [Nohl, Plotz HAR’09] used in German 
government and army buildings…
– But Hitag2 proximity cards are not available 
anymore in shops. They have been discontinued.
Here we concentrate just on car locks.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
Courtois, O’Neil, Quisquater 5
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Open Source vs. 
Closed Source CryptoAlgebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Secrecy:
Very frequently 
an obvious
business decision.
• Creates entry barriers for competitors.
• But also defends against hackers.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Kerckhoffs’ principle: [1883]
“The system must remain 
secure should it fall in 
enemy hands …”Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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*Remark:
Smart Cards:
They are already in ‘enemy’ hands
- even more for RFID…Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
Courtois, O’Neil, Quisquater 10
Kerckhoffs’ principle: [1883]
Most of the time: incorrectly understood. 
No obligation to disclose.
• Security when disclosed.
• Better security when not disclosed???Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Yes (1,2,3):
1. Military: 
layer the defences.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Yes (2):
2) 
Basic economics:
these 3 extra months
(and not more ￿)
are simply worth a 
a lot of money.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Yes (3):
3) 
Prevent the erosion of profitability 
/ barriers for entry 
for competitors / 
“inimitability”Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Kerckhoffs principle is kind of WRONG
in the world of smart cards
Reasons: 
• side channel attacks are HARD and COSTLY to 
prevent when the algo is known
• in some applications, for example Pay TV the 
system is broken immediately when the 
cryptographic algorithms are public.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Kerckhoffs principle is kind of WRONG?
Well OK, but then we need other means to evaluate evaluate evaluate evaluate crypto 
algorithms used by the industry.
• [OLD] private consulting…
• [NEW] TODAY: Automated Cryptanalysis Automated Cryptanalysis Automated Cryptanalysis Automated Cryptanalysis
Spec of              Try our
the cipher  =>     software Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Tarnovsky Lab [Freelance Silicon Hacker]
Only a few thousands of dollars worth of equipmentAlgebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Clear and Present Danger
Reverse engineering is NOT that hard.
No need for a FIB device 
(Focused Ion Beam, 0.5 M€).
A few thousand dollars microscope  +software.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Silicon Hacking => WikipediaTMAlgebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Crypto-1 is VERY WEAK
• Crypto 1 Has regular LFSR taps 
=>Broken in 0.05 seconds. 
[de Koning Gans et al, Esorics 2008]Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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much better:
• • • Crypto 1 Has regular LFSR taps  Crypto 1 Has regular LFSR taps  Crypto 1 Has regular LFSR taps 
=>Broken in 0.05 seconds =>Broken in 0.05 seconds =>Broken in 0.05 seconds.  .  . 
[de [de [de Koning Gans Koning Gans Koning Gans et al, et al, et al, Esorics Esorics Esorics 2008] 2008] 2008]
• Hitag 2 has IRREGULAR taps. Not so easy.
• State of the art: Inversion attacks: 
– [Ross Anderson: Searching for the Optimum 
Correlation Attack, In FSE’94] 
– Our present work is a sort of automated inversion attack 
where human insights into how to invert the augmented 
filter function are replaced by the [clever] SAT solver 
software…Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Silicon Hacking => Wikipedia
A Cryptanalyst can start working…Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Exhaustive Key Search
• 48 bits, about 4 years on 1 CPU. 
• But only hours/days with more expensive devices 
such as FPGA/Copacobana etc…Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Algebraic Cryptanalysis [Shannon]
Breaking a « good » cipher should require:
“as much work as solving a system of 
simultaneous equations in a large number 
of unknowns of a complex type”
[Shannon, 1949]Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Algebraic Cryptanalysis: An Emerging Technology
AES
XSL
Gartner’s Technology 
Hype CycleAlgebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Strong or Weak?
High Algebraic Immunity.
• Does NOT help. 
• Many “direct” algebraic attacks exist. We can 
break “any cipher”, if not too complex…
Our fastest attacks use algebraic equations + 
conversion + SAT solvers 
• [cf. recent attacks on DES and KeeLoq 
by Courtois and Bard 2007-08]Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Our Attacks
…AC can break “any cipher”, 
if not too complex…
Remark: 
• Other attacks can be faster.
• However, this method is more generally 
applicable: 
• we can also break many modified versions of Hitag2
• and this without any human intervention !Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Algebraic Cryptanalysis
Step 1.
Write a system of Multivariate Quadratic 
equations [MQ]
Step 2.
Solve it.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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ANF-to-CNF method - The Outsider
[Courtois, Bard, Jefferson]
Before we did try, 
we actually never believed it could work…
☺ ☺ ☺
Convert MQ to a SAT problem.
(both are NP-hard problems)Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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*ANF-to-CNF – Main Idea
Principle 1: 
each monomial = one dummy variable.
d+1 clauses for each degree d monomialAlgebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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*Also
Principle 2: 
Handling XORs – Not obvious. Long XORs
known to be hard problems for SAT solvers.
• Split longer XORs in several shorter with 
more dummy variables.
• About 4 h clauses for a XOR of size h.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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*ANF-to-CNF
This description is enough to produce a 
working version.
Space for non-trivial optimisations. See: 
Gregory V. Bard, Nicolas T. Courtois and Chris Jefferson: 
“Efficient Methods for Conversion and Solution of Sparse 
Systems of Low-Degree Multivariate Polynomials over 
GF(2) via SAT-Solvers”. eprint.iacr.org/2007/024Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Solving SAT
What are SAT solvers?
Heuristic algorithms for solving SAT problems.
• Guess some variables.
• Examine consequences.
• If a contradiction found, I can add a new clause saying “In 
this set of constraints one is false”.
Very advanced area of research.
Introduction for “dummies”: 
Gregory Bard PhD thesis.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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MiniSat 2.0. 
Winner of SAT-Race 2006 competition.
An open-source SAT solver package, 
by Niklas Eén, Niklas Sörensson, 
http://www.cs.chalmers.se/Cs/
Research/FormalMethods/MiniSat/
Compiles with gcc under both Unix and 
Windows.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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**ANF-to-CNF + MiniSat 2.0.
Gives amazing results in algebraic cryptanalysis of 
just any (not too complex/not too many rounds) 
cipher.  Also for random sparse MQ.
• Certain VERY large systems solved in seconds 
on PC (thousands of variables !).
• Few take a couple hours/days…
• Then infeasible, we hit the wall…
Jump from 0 to ¥.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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**What Can Be Done with SAT Solvers ?
• Clearly it is not the size of the system but the nature of it.
• Sometimes more powerful than Grobner Bases, 
sometimes less.
Paradoxes: 
• If you guess some variables, can become much slower ☺.
• Great variability in results (hard to compute an average 
running time, better to look at 20 % faster timings).
• Memory:
– For many cases tiny: 9 Mbytes while Magma hangs at > 2Gbytes 
for the same system.
– For some working cases: 1.5 Gbytes and substantial time. Then 
terminates with the solution as well.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Hitag2 ProtocolsAlgebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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From Original Philips Specs 
• Found on a Russian web side(!)
• Hitag 2 have two modes.
– Password mode [less secure]
– Crypto mode.
• We focus on the crypto mode. 
Sort of challenge-response protocol. 
– Mutual authentication.
– But the reader is authenticated first.
• Prevents tag-only attacks, or attacks at home: 
– sniffed data is needed.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Mutual Authentication in the Crypto mode
• The tag sends:
• The car picks a random IV (32 bits) and sends: 
• If the stream authenticator ks1 is correct, tag sends 
where PWST is a password, ks1,ks2 are the first 32+32 
bits of Hitag 2 keystream initialised with (K,IV)
11111 + (Config||PWST)Å ks2
5 + 32 bits
IV + ks1
32 + 32 bits
11111 + SN
5 +32 bitsAlgebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Sniffed Traces? 
We did not do the actual hacking of car keys.
Some recorded Hitag2 traces 
can be found in [Nohl, Plotz HAR’09]
https://har2009.org/program/attachments/113_breaking_hitag2_part1_hardware.pdfAlgebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Our Chosen IV Attack [not practical]
NOT practical.  
• An active attacker can send the data to the tag, 
but the tag will NOT respond if the authenticator 
is incorrect…
• Purely theoretical attack:
– We need to know the ks1 for 16 authentication 
attempts with 16 chosen IVs in the counter mode 
(consecutive integers on 32 bits).
– We combine 16 systems of equations. We don’t guess 
any bits.
– The complete 48-bit key is then found in 6 hours on a 
PC with MiniSat 2.0. 
• The full attack is 6 hours total.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Our Known IV Attack [practical !]
This attack slower BUT it is practical given the 
protocol: 
• Sniffed data from 4 transactions needed.
• 32 bits of the keystream per known IV are 
available (assuming PWST is already known). 
• We fix/guess 14 bits of the key and combine 4 
systems of equations for 4 known IVs.
– The solution is then found in 10 seconds on a PC with 
MiniSat 2.0. 
• The full attack on a full 48-bit key takes about 
214*10 s which is less than 2 days. Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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Cryptanalysis 
and the IndustryAlgebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
Courtois, O’Neil, Quisquater 48
Industry Impact?
“old” industry:
• Good excuse to replace these old systems. 
– Nobody thought they would be very secure by today’s standards…
“new” industry:
• Silicon hacking labs: we need to realize that: 
⇒what people in Europe/US do so that they can evaluate the security 
of the product (and publish a nice paper)…, 
⇒it will be done routinely in China and by several firms
BUT not for research, but for the manufacturing industry
(and it will be legal: in Chinese law), Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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*Example, cf. made-in-china.com:
Supports: 
Mercedes, 
BMWAlgebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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*Programmer 2: [All come from China]
Supports: BMW 
(2002 -2009)
CAS/CAS2/CAS3  CAS/CAS2/CAS3  CAS/CAS2/CAS3 
DG512 / CAS3 +  DG512 / CAS3 +  DG512 / CAS3 + 
DP512 key and  DP512 key and  DP512 key and 
remote control remote control remote controlAlgebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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*Programmer 3: [China]
Audi A8, VW Touareg, VW 
Phaeton, Bentley Continental, 
Porsche Cayenne, BMW
E38, E39, E46, E53, E60, E61,  E38, E39, E46, E53, E60, E61,  E38, E39, E46, E53, E60, E61, 
E63, E64, E65, E66, E87, E90,  E63, E64, E65, E66, E87, E90,  E63, E64, E65, E66, E87, E90, 
E91, E92 E91, E92 E91, E92Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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*Programmer 4:  [China]
Audi A8, VW Touareg, 
VW Phaeton, 
Bentley Continental, 
Porsche Cayenne, 
BMW
E38, E39, E46, E53,  E38, E39, E46, E53,  E38, E39, E46, E53, 
E60, E61, E63, E64,  E60, E61, E63, E64,  E60, E61, E63, E64, 
E65, E66, E87, E90,  E65, E66, E87, E90,  E65, E66, E87, E90, 
E91, E92 E91, E92 E91, E92Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
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*Programmer 5:  [China]
Audi A8, VW Touareg, 
VW Phaeton, 
Bentley Continental, 
Porsche Cayenne, 
BMW
E38, E39, E46, E53,  E38, E39, E46, E53,  E38, E39, E46, E53, 
E60, E61, E63, E64,  E60, E61, E63, E64,  E60, E61, E63, E64, 
E65, E66, E87, E90,  E65, E66, E87, E90,  E65, E66, E87, E90, 
E91, E92 E91, E92 E91, E92Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
Courtois, O’Neil, Quisquater 54
Conclusion
Old industrial ciphers can now be routinely broken by 
automated tools such as SAT solvers. 
The industry needs to recognise that:
– Reverse engineering is cheaper and easier than 
ever. A microscope + software A microscope + software A microscope + software… … …
– “Kindegarten crypto” fails.Algebraic Attacks on Hitag 2 Cipher
Courtois, O’Neil, Quisquater 55
New Perspective for the Industry
• Old / Kindegarten crypto fails.
• Custom/secret crypto is OK.
– But it needs to be evaluated and tested.
We propose a new method to evaluate evaluate evaluate evaluate crypto algorithms used by the industry. 
• [OLD] private consulting…with selective disclosure.
• [NEW] TODAY: Automated Cryptanalysis Automated Cryptanalysis Automated Cryptanalysis Automated Cryptanalysis
Spec of              Try our
the cipher  =>     software 
no need to 
DISCLOSE 
the SPEC!